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Increasing number of studies is focusing attention to c onstitutional analysis of 
European Union institutions and distribution of intra-institutional and inter-
institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Most of the studies 
are related to distribution of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers as 
reflecting the influence of member states (or, more precisely, member states 
governments). Significantly less attention is paid to the analysis of European 
Parliament (EP). In this paper we address the following question: Taking as 
decisional units national chapters of European political parties, is there a difference 
between a priori voting power of national groups in the case of  “national” 
coordination of voting and in the case of  “partisan” coordination of voting? By 
coordination of voting we mean two step process: in the first step there is an internal 
voting in the groups of units (national or partisan), in the second step there is a 
voting of aggregated groups (European political parties or national representations) 
in the EP. In the both cases the voting has an ideological dimension (elementary 
unit is a party), difference is only in dimension of aggregation. Power indices 
methodology is used to evaluate voting power of national party groups in the cases 
of partisan and national coordination of voting behaviour.  
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power indices, Shapley-Shubik power index  
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  During last two decades we can observe a boom of power indices literature related to 
constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intra-institutional and 
inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making.  
While most of the studies focused on models of institutional system of the European 
Union (EU) emphases analysis of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers as reflecting 
the influence of member states (or, more p recisely, member states governments)
1, 
significantly less attention is paid to the power analysis of European Parliament (EP). 
Historically first paper on model analysis of the EU institutions (Holler and Kellermann, 
1997) was focused on national distribution of voting power in the European Parliament (even 
before the first direct election of the EP in 1979), but there were not many followers of this 
direction of model oriented EP analysis. In Johnston (1982) the  “fairness” of regional 
representation in parliamentary bodies was investigated with empirical illustrations based on 
national representation in the European Parliament. Hosli (1997) analyzed new situation in EP 
after 1994 reallocation of seats of national representations and introduced into power 
considerations voting strength of European political parties. Nurmi (1997a) formulated model 
of political representation in the European Parliament (how voters of different political parties 
are represented from the point of view of influence of national chapters of European political 
parties that follows from ideological voting). Hix (2002) investigated two political dimensions 
                                                           
1  Distribution of power in the EU Council of Ministers and European and the recent development associated 
with the 1995 and 2004 enlargement of the EU has been analyzed in Brams and Affuso (1985), Widgrén (1994, 
1995), Steunenberg,, Smidtchen and Koboldt (1999)Tsebelis (1994), Nurmi (2000), Nurmi, Meskanen and Pajala 
(2001), Bindseil and Hantke (1997), Laruelle (1998), Felsenthal and Machover (2004), Holubiec and Mercik 
(1996), Kő nig and Brauninger (2001), Turnovec (1996, 2001, 2002), Plechanovovová (2004), Baldwin and 
Widgrén (2004), Sł omczyń ski and Ż yczkowski (2006) and others.  2 
(national and ideological) in EP voting and Noury (2002) provided empirical data about 
voting in the EP to establish the proportion of “nationally” and “ideologically” motivated 
voting. Mercik, Turnovec, and Mazurkiewicz (2004) demonstrate the fact that for some 
countries it would be more beneficial to coordinate voting of its members of EP on national 
level rather than on ideological  level. Hix, Noury and Roland (2006) provide the most 
extensive insight into the development of political process in the EP, of history of developing 
European political parties, conflicts and coalition formations.  
In this paper we extend Nurmi (1997a) and  Mercik, Turnovec and Mazurkiewicz 
(2004) analysis and formulate the following problem: taking as decisional units national 
groups of European political parties, is there a difference between a priori voting power of 
national groups in the case of “ national” coordination of voting and in the case of “partisan” 
coordination of voting? By coordination of voting we mean two step process: in the first step 
there is an internal voting in the groups of units (national or partisan), in the second step there 
is a voting of aggregated groups (European political parties or national representations). In 
both cases the voting has an ideological dimension (elementary unit is a national party group), 
difference is only in dimension of aggregation. 
To evaluate voting power (or influence) of actors in EP decision making we use the 
power indices methodology. Two most widely used power indices were proposed by Penrose 
and Banzhaf (1946, 1965) and Shapley and Shubik (1954). There exist also some other well 
defined power indices, such as Holler-Packel index (1983), Johnston index (1978), and Deegan-
Packel index (1979). The most comprehensive survey and analysis of power indices 
methodology see in Felsenthal and Machover (1998, 2004). We selected Shapley-Shubik power 
measure for its appealing properties (local and global monotonic property, equality of absolute 
and relative power, see Turnovec 1996, 2004), but any other power measure mentioned above 
can be used as well.  
In the second section of this paper we shortly recapitulate committee model and a priori 
voting power methodology in setting suitable for hierarchical and more-dimensional extension of 
the model. Section three presents two level committee model of power decomposition: in a 
“grand” committee consisting of subcommittees it is assumed that into the first step each 
subcommittee looks for joint position in internal subcommittee voting and than (depending on 
result of internal voting)  the subcommittees vote unanimously in the  “grand” committee 
decision making. A short description of the structure of recent EP is outlined in section four. 
Section five applies the two-level committee model with two dimensions of decision making 
hierarchy (ideological and national) in EP and defines measures of influence of national party 3 
groups, European political parties and national representations in each of two dimensions. Using 
Berg and Holler (1986) concept of randomized decision making rules and some empirically 
established proportion of ideological and nationally driven voting acts we can define (as a 
synthetic measure) expected power of national party groups, European political parties and 
national representations reflecting both dimension of voting. Empirical results of power analysis 
for ideological and national dimension of EP decision making are provided in section six. In 
section seven conclusions and further research possibilities in this field are discussed. 
 
2. Power Indices Methodology 
 
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of agents (indiviudals, parties) and wi (i = 1, ..., n) be the 
(real, non-negative) weight of the i-th agent and t be the total sum of weights of all agents. Let g 
be a real number such that 0 < g < t (minimal sum of weights necessary to approve a proposal). 
The (n+1)-tuple  ] ,..., , , [   =   ] [ n 2 1 w w w g g ω ,  such that  
  t g w t w         0   0,       ,   =   i i
n
1 = i
£ £ ‡ ￿  
 we call a committee (or a weighted voting body) of the size n = card N  with quota g, total 
weight t and allocation of weights.  )   ...,   ,   , (   =   n 2 1 w w w ω . Assume that each agent i uses in voting 
all his resources given by his weight wi undivided, i.e. he casts all his votes either as “ yes” votes, 
or as “ no” votes. Any non-empty subset of agents S ˝N we shall call a voting configuration. 
Given an allocation w and a quota g, we shall say that S ˝ N is a winning voting configuration, if 
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be the space of all committees of the size n, total weight t and quota g. 
A power index is a vector valued function  + ﬁ n R     T   :   Π that maps the space T of all 
committees of the size n into non-negative quadrant of Rn. A power index represents for each of 
the committee agents’ a “reasonable expectation” that she will be “decisive” in the sense that her 
vote (YES or NO) will determine the final outcome of voting. To define a particular power index 
one has to clarify what this “reasonable expectation” means, to identify some qualitative property 
(decisiveness) whose presence or absence in voting process can be established and quantified 4 
(Nurmi, 1997b). Generally there are two such properties, related to committee agents’ positions 
in voting, that are being used as a starting point for quantification of an a priori voting power: 
swing position and pivotal position of a committee agent. We shall use pivotal positions based 
power measure introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1954), so called SS-power.  
Let the numbers 1, 2, ..., n be fixed names of committee agents. Let (i1, i2, ..., i n) be a 
permutation of those numbers, agents of the committee, and let agent k is in position r in this 
permutation, i.e. k = ir. We shall say that an agent k of the committee is in a pivotal situation (has 
a pivot) with respect to a permutation (i1, i2, ..., in), if    
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Let us assume that a strict ordering of agents in a given permutation expresses an 
intensity of their support (preference) for a particular issue in the sense that, if an agent i s  
precedes in this permutation an agent i t, then agent i s support for the particular proposal to be 
decided is stronger than support by the agent it. One can assume that the group supporting the 
proposal will be formed in the order of positions of agents in the given permutation. If it is so, 
then the agent k will be in situation when the group composed from preceding agents in the 
given permutation still does not have enough of votes to pass the proposal, and a group of agents 
place behind him in the permutation has not enough of votes to block the proposal. The group 
that will manage his support will win. Agent in a pivotal situation has a decisive influence on the 
final outcome. In an abstract setting, assuming many voting acts and all possible preference 
orderings equally likely, under the full veil of ignorance about other aspects of individual agents’ 
preferences, it makes sense to evaluate an a priori voting power of each committee member as a 
probability of being in pivotal situation. This probability is measured by the SS-power index: 





i = ω g p  
where pi is the number of pivotal positions of the committee agent i and n! is the number of 
permutations of all committee agents (number of different strict orderings). 
 
3. Two level committee model of power decomposition 
 
Let p = (p1, p2, … , pn)  be the vector of Shapley-Shubik power indices of agents in the 
committee  ] ,..., , , [   =   ] [ n 2 1 w w w g g ω , . Then pi is a probability that agent i ∈  N will be in a 
pivotal situation.  5 
Each agent i can be understood as a group Gi with cardinality wi (number of individual 
members of the committee belonging to i). Let us assume that group Gi consists of several 
subgroups. Let G ij ￿ G i be a subgroup j of the group G i and wij = card (Gij), number of 
members of Gi belonging to Gij. Assuming that each group (agent) i is partitioned into m(i) 
subgroups Gij, we can consider the following two step procedure of voting: first each agent Gi 
looks for joint position in a subcommittee [gi; wi1, wi2, … , wim(i)], where gi is the quota for 
voting in subcommittee i (e.g. the simple majority). There is a vote inside the group first 
(micro-game) and then the group is voting together in the committee on the basis of results of 
internal voting (macro-game). 
If si = (si1, si2, … , sim(i)) is the internal power distribution in subcommittee [gi; wi1, wi2, 
… , wim(i)] where sij be an internal power of subgroup Gij in micro-game, and pi = (pi1, pi2, … , 
pim(i)) be the power distribution of members of group G i  in committee 
] ,..., , , [   =   ] [ n 2 1 w w w g g ω ,  then the voting power pij of the subgroup Gij in macro-game is pij = 
pisij expressing the probability of the subgroup G ij being pivotal in the committee decision 








i ij p p  
so we obtained decomposition of the power of agent i among the subgroups Gij. 
  There exist different more-level committees. For example the upper houses of national 
parliaments have twofold affiliation of its individual members: they represent citizens of the 
region they were elected in and on the other side they are affiliated to some political party. 
The same is true for European Parliament: each individual member is affiliated to some 
European party faction, and at the same time he represents interests of citizens of its own 
country. Formally we can consider two models of such a committee: one model with agents 
aggregated into the party factions, the second with regional (country) aggregation. Then it 
makes sense to consider the distribution of power in each dimension: partisan coordination 
and national coordination. 
   
4. European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament, designed to represent the citizens of European Union 
member states, is the only directly elected institution of the European Union. European 
Parliament (EP) has a dual structure: members of EP represent their own countries (and in 6 
certain extent they are aware of national interests) and at the same time they belong to 
national political parties (and in this sense they represents ideological preferences of the 
groups of citizens). Internally, members of European Parliament are clustered in European 
political parties, forming clubs (factions) in the EP. 
In the sixth legislative term (2004-2009) there are 732 members of the EP elected by 
citizens of 25 member states.
2 They are divided into seven political groups (European political 
parties): 
PPE-DE - Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European 
Democrats, 
PSE - Socialist Group in the European Parliament, 
ALDE - Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, 
Verts/ALE - Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance, 
GUE/NGL – Con-federal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left, 
IND/DEM - Independence/Democracy Group, 
UEN - Union for Europe of the Nations Group, 
NI - Not-attached Members. 
  European Parliament acts on the basis of simple majority rule, and in some cases 
absolute majority is required. Composition of the European Parliament after 2004 election is 













                                                           
2 We are reflecting situation after 2004 election, before 2007 extension. 7 
Table 1 












DEM  UEN       NI     Total 
Austria  6  7    2          3  18 
Belgium  6  7  6  2        3  24 
Cyprus  3    1    2          6 
Czech R.  14  2       6  1    1  24 
Denmark  1  5  4  1  1  1  1    14 
Estonia  1  3  2                6 
Finland  4  3  5  1  1          14 
France  17  31  11  6  3  3    7  78 
Germany  49  23  7  13  7          99 
Greece  11  8       4  1       24 
Hungary  13  9  2                24 
Ireland  5  1  1    1  1  4    13 
Italy  24  16  12  2  7  4  9  4  78 
Latvia  3    1  1       4    9 
Lithuania  2  2  7          2    13 
Luxemburg  3  1  1  1             6 
Malta  2  3                   5 
Netherlands  7  7  5  4  2  2       27 
Poland  19  8  4       10  7  6  54 
Portugal  9  12       3          24 
Slovakia  8  3                3  14 
Slovenia  4  1  2                7 
Spain  24  24  2  3  1          54 
Sweden  5  5  3  1  2  3       19 
United Kingdom  28  19  12  5  1  10    3  78 
Total  268  200  88  42  41  36  27  30  732 
 
 
Individual members of the EP represent citizens of member states and number of seats 
is distributed roughly proportionally to the size of population among the member states. The 
election to the EP has an ideological dimension: using proportional electoral systems citizens 
are casting votes for national political parties. 
EP is institutionally structured on ideological principle, the individual members work 
in factions of the European political parties. While empirical evidence indicates, that almost in 
all cases members of the national party g roups are voting together, Noury (2004) 
demonstrated, using empirical data about voting acts in EP of the fifth term, that ideological 
dimension in EP voting prevails (in almost 80% of cases EP members voted according 
European party affiliation), but there were still more than 20% of voting driven by national 8 
dimension (voting by national affiliation). Consequently, to measure influence in the EP basic 
decision making unit is a national party groups and it makes sense to measure not only voting 
power of European political parties and/or voting power of national representations, but also 
the voting power of national party groups, both in ideologically driven voting and nationally 
driven voting. 
 
5. Modeling distribution of power in the European Parliament 
 
   To evaluate distribution of power of national party groups in European Parliament as 
basic decision making units we use the Shapley-Shubik concept of voting power and model of 
two-level committee from section 3. To reflect the double dimensionality in voting we use 
two dimensions of committee structure: the European party factions decomposed into national 
groups, and the national representations decomposed into the party groups. Basic unit remains 
the same in both cases: national party group. Then we obtain two schemes of decision making 
coordination: first based on European party factions and national party groups, second based 
on national representations and national party groups. 
First (ideological) dimension leads to committee model A with European parties as 
agents voting together, [g, p1, p2, … , pn], the second (national) dimension leads to committee 
model B with national representations as agents voting together, [g, n1, n2, … , nm], where g is 
the quota (the same for both models), pi  is the weight (number of seats) of European party i, 
nk is the weight (number of seats) of member state k (n is the number of European parties, m 
is the number of member states). 
Committee A generates n subcommittees Aj such that [gj, p1j, p2j, … , pmj], where pij 
denotes number of members of party group j from country i, gj being a specific quota for 
subcommittee Aj. Each of these subcommittees consists of at most m national subgroups of 
the European political party j, where in each subcommittee the members of each party from 








n A A A
A
,..., , 2 1
 
as the ideologically structured committee system {A/Aj}. 
Committee B generates m subcommittees Bk such that [dk, pk1, pk2, … , pkn], where pki 
denotes number of members of party group i from country k, dk being a specific quota for 9 
subcommittee Bk. Each of these subcommittees consists of at most n party subgroups of the 
national representation k, where in each subcommittee the members of from the same party j 
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as the nationally structured committee system {B/Bk}. 
Let us denote by 
aj  voting power of the European party  j in the committee A (voting by ideological 
dimension), probability that party j will be pivotal in ideologically coordinated voting, 
bk  voting power of the nation k in the committee B (voting by national dimension), 
probability that nation k will be pivotal in nationally coordinated voting, 
akj  voting power of  the national segment k of party j in subcommittee Aj, probability that 
national segment k of party j will be pivotal in internal party voting,  
bkj  voting power of the national segment k of party j in subcommittee Bk, probability that 
party segment j of representation of country k will be pivotal in internal national voting,  
pkj  voting power of the national segment k of party j in the committee {A/Aj}, probability 
that national segment k of party j will be pivotal in the grand committee voting based on 
ideological coordination, 
jkj  voting power of the national segment k of party j in the committee {B/Bk}, probability 
that party segment j of national representation k will be pivotal in the grand committee voting 
based on national coordination. 
Using standard algorithms we can find SS-power indices aj in committee A and akj in 
committees Aj (probabilities of being pivotal in corresponding committees) and then calculate  
j kj kj a a p =  . 
as conditional probability of two independent random events – pivotal position of j in grand 
committee A and pivotal position of  k in subcommittee Aj. From probabilistic interpretation 
and properties of SS-power indices 
￿ ￿
= =
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The sum of voting powers of national groups of European political party j in ideological 
voting is equal to the voting power of the European political party. The total power is 
decomposed among the national units of the party. In a more intuitive way: the national group 
k of political party j is in a pivotal position in ideologically structured committee system 
{A/Aj} if and only if it is in pivotal position in subcommittee Aj and the party j is in a pivotal 
position in committee A. 
Less trivial is the following result: The country k is in a pivotal position in ideological 
coordination of voting if some party group from k is in pivotal position. Pivotal positions of 
national party groups of the same country in ideologically voting are mutually exclusive 
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(sum of power indices of all party groups from member state k). Then qk can be interpreted as 
measure of country k influence in ideologically coordinated voting. From properties of SS-
power it follows that  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= = = = = =
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There is no other direct way how to evaluate qk. 
  In the same way we can find bk in committee B and bkj in committees Bk and then 
calculate      
k kj kj b b j =   
as conditional probability of two independent random events - pivotal position of k in grand 
committee B and pivotal position of j in subcommittee Bk). Measure of party j influence in 
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1 1
J b b j  
(sum of power indices of party group j from all member states). 
Berg and Holler (1986) introduced concept of randomized decision making rules: let D 
be a set of decision making rules and Q a probability measure over D, then appropriate power 
measure in family of committees [d˛D; w1, w2, … , wn]  is expected value 
() ii dD ddQ pp
˛ = ￿    11 
where pi(d) stands for power index in the committee  [d˛D; w1, w2, … , wn]. For discrete 
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In our case we have two matrices of power indices of national party groups, P and F, 
corresponding to two decision making rules (partisan and national coordination). Assuming 
mix of national and party coordination with probability l of party coordination of voting and 
1-l probability of national coordination of voting, we obtain expected voting power of 
national party groups in our model as 
S(l) = lP+(1-l)F 
where S(l) = (sij(l)),  sij(l) stands for expected a priori voting power of party group j from 
region i.   
 
6. Illustrative example 
 
Let us consider hypothetical parliament consisting of representatives of three regions 
A, B, and C decomposed into three super-regional parties L, M, R (altogether 6 national party 





      L  M  R  total 
        seats 
A       7  10   3    20 
B      15  15   0    30 
C       3  22  25    50 
total      25  47  28  100   
 
 
Influence of super-regional parties 
Committee   [51; 25, 47, 28] 
  Voting power  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) 
 Influence of regional representations 
  Committee  [51; 20, 30, 50] 
  Voting power (1/6, 1/6, 2/3) 
Influence of regional party groups in ideologically coordinated voting? 12 
Party group L 
  Part L committee [13; 7, 15, 3] 
  Voting power of regional party groups in party L committee (0, 1, 0) 
  Total power of L in the parliament ideological voting 1/3 is decomposed among the 
regional party groups (0, 1/3, 0) 
Party group M 
  Party M committee [24; 10, 15, 22] 
  Voting power of regional party groups in party M committee (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) 
  Total power of M in the parliament ideological voting 1/3 is decomposed among the 
regional party groups (1/9, 1/9, 1/9) 
Party group R 
  Party R committee [15; 3, 0, 25] 
  Voting power of regional party groups in party R committee (0, 0, 1) 
  Voting power of R in the parliament ideological voting 1/3 is decomposed among the 
regional party groups (0, 0, 1/3) 
Evaluation of voting power of regional party groups in ideological voting is provided 
in Table 3 
Table 3 
Regions/parties 
      L  M  R  total 
           voting power 
A       0  1/9   0    1/9 
B      3/9  1/9   0    4/9 
C       0  1/9  3/9    4/9 
total      3/9  3/9  3/9     1 
 
 
Table 3 provides decomposition of power among national party groups in 
ideologically coordinated voting (last row) and at the same time decomposition of power 
(national influence) among national representations in ideologically coordinated voting (last 
column). 
Influence of regional party groups in regionally coordinated voting? 
Region A 
  Region A committee [11; 7, 10, 3] 
  Voting power of regional party groups in region A committee (1/6, 4/6, 1/6) 
  Total power of region A in the parliament regionally coordinated voting 1/6 is 
decomposed among the regional party groups (1/36, 4/36, 1/36) 13 
Region B 
  Region B committee [16; 15, 15, 0] 
  Voting power of regional party groups in region A committee (1/2, 1/2, 0) 
  Total power of region B in the parliament regionally coordinated voting 1/6 is 
decomposed among the regional party groups (3/36, 3/36, 0) 
Region C 
  Region C committee [26; 3, 22, 25] 
  Voting power of regional party groups in region C committee (1/6, 2/60, 3/6) 
  Voting power of region C in the parliament regionally coordinated voting 4/6 is 
decomposed among the regional party groups (4/36, 8/36, 12/36) 
Evaluation of voting power of regional party groups in regionally coordinated voting 










      L  M  R  total 
             voting power 
A      1/36  4/36  1/36    6/36 
B      3/36  3/36   0    6/36 
C       4/36  8/36  12/36   24/36 
total      8/36  15/36  13/36     1 
 
 
Table 4 provides decomposition of power among national party groups in regionally 
coordinated voting (last column) and at the same time decomposition of power (ideological 
influence) among super/regional parties in nationally coordinated voting (last row). 
Let us assume that 3/4 of voting acts are ideologically coordinated and 1/4 of voting 
acts are regionally coordinated. Then, from the following matrix equation 
 
           
 14 
we obtain the expected voting power of regional party groups, super-regional parties and 




      L  M  R  total 
      expected voting power 
A       1/144 16/144 1/144   18/144 
B      39/144 15/144  0   54/144 
C       4/144 20/144 48/144  72/144 
total      44/144 51/144 49/144      1 
 
  
7. Empirical results 
 
  In Table 6 we provide internal distribution of Shapley-Shubik power of national party 
groups in national representations (in our notations bkj). Table 7 presents distribution of SS 
power among national party groups, national representations and European parties in simple 
majority voting based on national coordination (in our notations jkj, bk and xj). Table 8 shows 
internal distribution of Shapley-Shubik power of national party groups in European parties (in 
our notations  akj). Distribution of SS power among national party groups’ and national 
representations in simple majority voting based on ideological coordination is presented in 
Table 9 (in our notations pkj, aj and qk). Table 10 compares power of national representations 
in voting based on partisan and national coordination and Table 11 compares power of 
European political parties on partisan and national coordination. All results are multiplied by 
100 (in percentage terms), data are rounded. Using Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) empirical 
evaluation of proportion of ideologically and national driven voting coordination with l = 0,8 
and 1-l = 0,2, we obtain expected power of national party groups, European political parties 













Internal distribution of Shapley-Shubik power of national party groups in national 
representations 
 
Country  Internal SS-power of national party groups in national representations (in %) 
  PPE-DE  PSE  ALDE  Verts/ALE  GUE/NGL  IND/DEM  UEN  NI  Total 
Austria  25  41,67  0  8,33  0  0  0  25  100 
Belgium  28,33  36,68  28,33  3,33  0  0  0  3,33  100 
Cyprus  66,67  0  16,66  0  16,66  0  0  0  100 
Czech R.  100  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  100 
Denmark  7,14  35,72  21,44  7,14  7,14  7,14  7,14  7,14  100 
Estonia  16,67  66,67  16,67  0  0  0  0  0  100 
Finland  28,33  28,33  36,67  3,33  3,33  0  0  0  100 
France  13,81  50,48  13,81  7,14  3,81  3,81  0  7,14  100 
Germany  60  10  10  10  10  0  0  0  100 
Greece  41,67  25  0  0  25  8,33  0  0  100 
Hungary  100  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  100 
Ireland  40  10  10  0  10  10  20  0  100 
Italy  38,46  21,07  14,4  1,07  7,02  4,4  9,18  4,4  100 
Latvia  16,67  0  16,67  16,67  0  0  50  0  100 
Lithuania  0  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  100 
Luxemburg  75  8,33  8,33  8,33  0  0  0  0  100 
Malta  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  0  100 
Netherlands  30  30  20  6,67  6,67  6,67  0  0  100 
Poland  43,37  13,33  8,33  0  0  18,33  8,33  8,33  100 
Portugal  16,67  66,67  0  0  16,67  0  0  0  100 
Slovakia  100  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  100 
Slovenia  100  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  100 
Spain  31,67  31,67  6,67  23,34  6,67  0  0  0  100 
Sweden  30  30  13,33  0  13,33  13,33  0  0  100 
United Kingdom  44,28  19,29  19,29  2,62  0,95  10,95  0  2,62  100 
 
 16 
Table 7 Distribution of SS power of national party groups in simple majority voting based on national coordination 
 
SS power of national party groups in voting based on national 
coordination  














N  NI 
representations  
based on national 
coordination 
Austria  0,59  0,98  0,00  0,19  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,5
9  2,34 
Belgium  0,89  1,15  0,89  0,10  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,1
0  3,14 
Cyprus  0,51  0,00  0,13  0,00  0,13  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  0,77 
Czech R.  3,14  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  3,14 
Denmark  0,13  0,65  0,39  0,13  0,13  0,13  0,13 
0,1
3  1,81 
Estonia  0,13  0,51  0,13  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  0,77 
Finland  0,51  0,51  0,66  0,06  0,06  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  1,81 
France  1,52  5,56  1,52  0,79  0,42  0,42  0,00 
0,7
9  11,02 
Germany  8,72  1,45  1,45  1,45  1,45  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  14,53 
Greece  1,31  0,79  0,00  0,00  0,79  0,26  0,00 
0,0
0  3,14 
Hungary  3,01  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  3,01 
Ireland  0,67  0,17  0,17  0,00  0,17  0,17  0,34 
0,0
0  1,68 
Italy  4,24  2,32  1,59  0,12  0,77  0,48  1,01 
0,4
8  11,02 
Latvia  0,19  0,00  0,19  0,19  0,00  0,00  0,58 
0,0
0  1,16 
Lithuania  0,00  0,00  1,68  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  1,68 
Luxemburg  0,58  0,06  0,06  0,06  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  0,77 
Malta  0,00  0,64  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  0,64 
Netherlands  1,06  1,06  0,71  0,24  0,24  0,24  0,00 
0,0
0  3,54 
Poland  3,18  0,98  0,61  0,00  0,00  1,35  0,61 
0,6
1  7,35 
Portugal  0,52  2,09  0,00  0,00  0,52  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  3,14 
Slovakia  1,81  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  1,81 
Slovenia  0,90  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  0,90 
Spain  2,33  2,33  0,49  1,71  0,49  0,00  0,00 
0,0
0  7,35 
Sweden  0,74  0,74  0,33  0,00  0,33  0,33  0,00 
0,0
0  2,47 
United 
Kingdom  4,88  2,13  2,13  0,29  0,10  1,21  0,00 
0,2
9  11,02 
SS power of 
parties based 
on national 
coordination  41,57 
24,1
2  13,13  5,34  5,60  4,58  2,67 
2,9
9  100 17 
 
Table 8 




  Internal SS power of national party groups in European political parties  
Country  PPE-DE  PSE  ALDE  Verts/ALE  GUE/NGL  IND/DEM  UEN  NI 
Austria  2,09  3,17  0  4,15  0  0  0  9,76 
Belgium  2,09  3,17  6,74  4,15  0  0  0  9,76 
Cyprus  1,04  0  1,07  0  4,53  0  0  0 
Czech R.  5,02  0,89  0  0  15,14  2,54  0  1,43 
Denmark  0,34  2,24  4,39  2,01  2,25  2,54  6,67  0 
Estonia  0,34  1,33  2,16  0  0  0  0  0 
Finland  1,39  1,33  5,55  2,01  2,25  0  0  0 
France  6,16  15,97  13,18  12,8  6,98  8,17  0  25,24 
Germany  20,81  11,27  7,96  39,57  18,27  0  0  0 
Greece  3,9  8,58  0  0  9,54  2,54  0  0 
Hungary  4,65  4,11  1,07  0  0  0  0  0 
Ireland  1,74  0,44  1,07  0  2,25  2,54  13,33  0 
Italy  8,94  7,55  14,6  4,15  18,27  12,06  36,67  11,9 
Latvia  1,04  0  1,07  2,01  0  0  13,33  0 
Lithuania  0,69  0,89  7,96  0  0  0  6,67  0 
Luxemburg  1,04  0,44  1,07  2,01  0  0  0  0 
Malta  0,69  1,33  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Netherlands  2,45  3,17  5,55  8,26  4,53  4,68  0  0 
Poland  6,94  3,63  4,39  0  0  28,37  23,33  22,38 
Portugal  3,17  5,55  0  0  6,98  0  0  0 
Slovakia  2,81  1,33  0  0  0  0  0  9,76 
Slovenia  1,39  0,44  2,16  0  0  0  0  0 
Spain  8,94  11,82  2,16  6,18  2,25  0  0  0 
Sweden  1,74  2,24  3,25  2,01  4,53  8,17  0  0 
United Kingdom  10,6  9,1  14,6  10,68  2,25  28,37  0  9,76 




Distribution of SS power of national party groups in simple majority voting based on party 
coordination 
 
  SS power of national party groups in voting based on partisan coordination   SS power of national representations 
Country  PPE-DE  PSE  ALDE  Verts/ALE  GUE/NGL  IND/DEM  UEN  NI  based on partisan coordination 
Austria  0,85  0,60  0,00  0,27  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,43  2,14 
Belgium  0,85  0,60  0,96  0,27  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,43  3,10 
Cyprus  0,42  0,00  0,15  0,00  0,26  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,84 
Czech R.  2,04  0,17  0,00  0,00  0,88  0,13  0,00  0,06  3,28 
Denmark  0,14  0,42  0,62  0,13  0,13  0,13  0,29  0,00  1,87 
Estonia  0,14  0,25  0,31  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,70 
Finland  0,56  0,25  0,79  0,13  0,13  0,00  0,00  0,00  1,87 
France  2,50  3,02  1,87  0,84  0,41  0,42  0,00  1,11  10,17 
Germany  8,45  2,13  1,13  2,59  1,07  0,00  0,00  0,00  15,37 
Greece  1,58  1,62  0,00  0,00  0,56  0,13  0,00  0,00  3,89 
Hungary  1,89  0,78  0,15  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  2,82 
Ireland  0,71  0,08  0,15  0,00  0,13  0,13  0,59  0,00  1,79 
Italy  3,63  1,43  2,07  0,27  1,07  0,62  1,61  0,52  11,22 
Latvia  0,42  0,00  0,15  0,13  0,00  0,00  0,59  0,00  1,29 
Lithuania  0,28  0,17  1,13  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,29  0,00  1,87 
Luxemburg  0,42  0,08  0,15  0,13  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,79 
Malta  0,28  0,25  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,53 
Netherlands  0,99  0,60  0,79  0,54  0,26  0,24  0,00  0,00  3,43 
Poland  2,82  0,69  0,62  0,00  0,00  1,45  1,03  0,98  7,59 
Portugal  1,29  1,05  0,00  0,00  0,41  0,00  0,00  0,00  2,74 
Slovakia  1,14  0,25  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,43  1,82 
Slovenia  0,56  0,08  0,31  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,95 
Spain  3,63  2,24  0,31  0,40  0,13  0,00  0,00  0,00  6,71 
Sweden  0,71  0,42  0,46  0,13  0,26  0,42  0,00  0,00  2,41 
United Kingdom  4,30  1,72  2,07  0,70  0,13  1,45  0,00  0,43  10,81 
SS power of parties 
Based on partisan 
Coordination  40,60  18,93  14,17  6,55  5,83  5,12  4,40  4,40  100 19 
Table 10 
Power of national representations in voting based on partisan and national coordination 
 
  SS power of national representations  SS power of national representations 
Country   based on party coordination   based on national coordination 
Austria  2,14  2,34 
Belgium  3,10  3,14 
Cyprus  0,84  0,77 
Czech R.  3,28  3,14 
Denmark  1,87  1,81 
Estonia  0,70  0,77 
Finland  1,87  1,81 
France  10,17  11,02 
Germany  15,37  14,53 
Greece  3,89  3,14 
Hungary  2,82  3,01 
Ireland  1,79  1,68 
Italy  11,22  11,02 
Latvia  1,29  1,16 
Lithuania  1,87  1,68 
Luxemburg  0,79  0,77 
Malta  0,53  0,64 
Netherlands  3,43  3,54 
Poland  7,59  7,35 
Portugal  2,74  3,14 
Slovakia  1,82  1,81 
Slovenia  0,95  0,9 
Spain  6,71  7,35 
Sweden  2,41  2,47 
United Kingdom  10,81  11,02 







Power of European political parties in voting based on partisan and national coordination 
 
     
  SS power of European parties  SS power of European parties 
Party   based on party coordination   based on national coordination 
PPE-DE  40,6  41,57 
PSE  18,93  24,12 
ALDE  14,17  13,13 
Verts/ALE  6,55  5,34 
GUE/NGL  5,83  5,6 
IND/DEM  5,12  4,58 
UEN  4,4  2,67 
NI  4,4  2,99 
  100  100 
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Table 12 
Expected power of national party groups, European political parties and national 
representations based on mix of national and party coordination with l = 0,8 
 
 
Expected SS power of national party groups in voting based on mix of national 
 and party coordination  
Expected SS power of national 
representations based on mix 
 of national and party 
 coordination 
Country  PPE-DE  PSE  ALDE  Verts/ALE  GUE/NGL  IND/DEM  UEN  NI    
Austria  0,80  0,68  0,00  0,26  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,46  2,19 
Belgium  0,86  0,71  0,94  0,24  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,36  3,11 
Cyprus  0,44  0,00  0,15  0,00  0,24  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,82 
Czech R.  2,26  0,13  0,00  0,00  0,71  0,10  0,00  0,05  3,25 
Denmark  0,14  0,47  0,58  0,13  0,13  0,13  0,26  0,03  1,86 
Estonia  0,14  0,30  0,27  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,71 
Finland  0,55  0,30  0,76  0,12  0,12  0,00  0,00  0,00  1,85 
France  2,31  3,53  1,80  0,83  0,41  0,42  0,00  1,05  10,34 
Germany  8,50  2,00  1,19  2,36  1,14  0,00  0,00  0,00  15,20 
Greece  1,53  1,46  0,00  0,00  0,60  0,16  0,00  0,00  3,74 
Hungary  2,11  0,62  0,12  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  2,86 
Ireland  0,70  0,10  0,15  0,00  0,14  0,14  0,54  0,00  1,77 
Italy  3,75  1,61  1,97  0,24  1,01  0,59  1,49  0,52  11,18 
Latvia  0,38  0,00  0,16  0,14  0,00  0,00  0,59  0,00  1,27 
Lithuania  0,22  0,13  1,24  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,23  0,00  1,83 
Luxemburg  0,45  0,08  0,13  0,12  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,79 
Malta  0,22  0,33  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,55 
Netherlands  1,01  0,69  0,77  0,48  0,26  0,24  0,00  0,00  3,45 
Poland  2,89  0,75  0,62  0,00  0,00  1,43  0,94  0,91  7,54 
Portugal  1,13  1,26  0,00  0,00  0,43  0,00  0,00  0,00  2,82 
Slovakia  1,27  0,20  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,34  1,82 
Slovenia  0,63  0,07  0,24  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,94 
Spain  3,37  2,26  0,34  0,67  0,20  0,00  0,00  0,00  6,84 
Sweden  0,71  0,49  0,43  0,11  0,28  0,40  0,00  0,00  2,42 
United Kingdom  4,42  1,80  2,08  0,62  0,13  1,40  0,00  0,40  10,85 
Expected SS power 
of European  parties 
based on mix of 
national and party 
coordination  40,80  19,97  13,96  6,31  5,79  5,01  4,05  4,12  100,00 
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8. Concluding remarks 
 
  We tried to show that it is possible to evaluate not only the influence of European 
political parties as entities in ideologically driven voting and of national representations as 
entities in nationally driven voting, as it is usually done in analytical papers (Holler and 
Kellermann (1977), Hosli (1997), Nurmi (1997a)) but also the influence of national chapters 
of European political parties both in ideological and national voting and national influence in 
ideological voting,  as well as the European political parties influence in national voting. 
Moreover, using mix of partisan coordination and national coordination (based on empirical 
ex post data about voting and assuming the same behavior in future), we can evaluate 
expected power of national party groups, European political parties and national 
representations reflecting both ideological and national dimension. 
  We demonstrated that different dimensions of voting (ideological, national) lead to 
different levels of influence of the same national party group, European political party and 
national representation. For example, by our model the national chapter of the two Czech 
Social Democrats has zero influence in national coordination of voting, but measurable non-
zero influence in partisan coordination within parliamentary faction of PSE. The national 
influence of the Czech Republic in ideologically coordinated voting is greater than in 
nationally coordinated voting. While the influence of PSE in ideologically coordinated voting 
is 18.93%, in nationally coordinated voting it increases to 24.12%. Disaggregated structural 
effects, abandoned by most of standard analyses, are at least as important as aggregated 
effects. 
  The findings of our model analysis open the problem of strategic considerations, such 
as coalition formation, that can go across the existing structure, e.g. coalition of a country 
representation with some European political party, or preferring national coordination of 
different party groups of the same country to i deological coordination (this problem was 
opened with respect to Poland in Mercik, Turnovec, and Mazurkiewicz, 2004). There is a 
broad area for extensions of presented model. 
  Used methodology of power indices has its critics. What exactly power indices are 
measuring is controversial, see e.g. arguments of Garrett and Tsebelis (1999) about ignoring 
preferences, and response of Holler and Widgrén (1999), but they are of general interest to 
political science because they may measure players’ ability to get what they want. Admittedly 
significant share of decisions under the EU decision making procedures are taken without 
recourse to a formal vote. But it may well be the case that the outcome of negotiation is 22 
conditioned by the possibility that a vote could be taken, and than a priori evaluation of voting 
power matters. Moreover, analyses of institutional design of decision making could benefit from 
power indices methodology (Holler and Owen 2001, Lane and Berg 1999). Continuing research 
and deeper understanding of power indices methodology reflect an actual demand for 
amendment of traditional legal and political analysis of institutional problems by quantitative 
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